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6 October 1972

a call to resist
illegitimate authority

763 Massachusetts Avenue, 14, Cambridge, Mass. 02139

Newsletter #66

\/\/HY VOTE?
THE VIETNAMESE AND US
Andrew Himes
(Note: This article does not necessarily represent
Resist's editorial position. ed.)
The chronicle of the Nixon years is grisly:
4.5 million Indochinese civilians killed, wounded,
or refugeed. 1.5 million soldiers on all sides
killed or wounded. 40,000 Vietnamese civilians
executed without trial under the Phoenix program.
3.7 million tons of bombs dropped, 2 tons every
60 seconds. 13 million bomb craters. 750,000 acres
of crop and forest land bull-dozed over. $59 billion expended.
The Nixon-Thieu partnership, especially since the
resumption of heavy, saturation bombing in April,
has wreaked an incredible degree of human and physical destruction on Indochina. It would be inexcusable if we did not take and fight for every
chance we get to end the war on the terms of the
Vietnamese people. We cannot afford the luxury of
the unthreatened.

MEI,

TERROR FROM THE SKY
Because of the gravity of U.S. attacks on the
dike system of North Vietnam we are reprinting this
month a section of a report titled ''Terror from
the Sky" prepared by John Gliedman for the Vietnam
Resource Centre in Cambridge, Mass. We have also
received in the last couple of weeks, a report
from Yves Lacoste, Professor of Geography at the
University of Paris, Who has recently returned
from Vietnam. He will be presenting this report
to the International Commission to Investigate
War Crimes at an upcoming conference in Stockholm.
Professor Lacoste's findings are as tragic in
their consequence for the Vietnamese people as
are those of John Gliedman.
In the closing stages of the Korean war, the
U.S.A.F. was given the task of destroying the dams
of North Korea. An official U.S. account of the war
states that "these strikes, largely passed over by
the press, the military observer• and newscommentators
in favor of attention arresting and less meaningful
'
events, constituted one of the most significant
operations of the Korean war ••• o To the Communists
the smashing of the dams meant primarily the
'
smashing of their chief sustenance - rice ••• (and with
t-'h .. t-"\ ot-o ..... 7!:lt-inn ~nd slow death".
The Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal a generation
ago sentenced to death Seyss-Inquart who as
German High Commissioner for Holland in 1944 h d
ordered the destruction of the Dutch dikes t' ~
the Allied advance. On April 30 this year • ino TsPY!l'I,
ow
Nixon referred to the Vietnamese dikes as "strategic targets"' indicating that he now accepted
the Joint Chiefs of Staff long standing definition
of them as legitimate targets; he refused to rule
out attacks on them in the near future
0

continued on page 2

George McGovern is the nominee of the Democratic
Party. And McGovern, if he is elected, has it in
his power to end the war. He has promised to stop
all bombing of Indochina on inauguration day, to
cease all support for the Thieu regime, and to
withdraw all American troops and war materiel from
Southeast Asia within 90 days. Politicians, as a
breed, make promises they don't keep; McGovern is
no exception. But those are exceptional promises.
They are the linchpin, the heart and soul, of the
McGovern candidacy. They mean the difference between life and death for millions of Indochinese
people. The viability of those promises now critically needs analyzing and understanding.
McGovern has repeatedly claimed that his defense
budget, while slashing more than $30 billion in
waste a,nd excess baggage from the current budget,
would still leave the US "second to none" in military power. If he is thus committed to maintaining the US's hegemonic international influence,
why would he grant self-determination to the Vietnamese? The answer lies in the changing attitudes
of military and civilian decision-makers throughout the war. First, they have never questioned Indochina's critical importance to US interests.
It is important not primarily because of its economic exploitability, its trade potential, or its
wealth of natural resources, but because it forms
the keystone of America's defensive strategy in
Asia; it is a vital link in the US's chain of allied client states encircling China. Its loss
would threaten the stability of the US's world
systemo As Richard Duboff says, in the Gravel edition of the Pentagon Papers, "(Already by 1954),
South Vietnam was held to be vital to American
security, its future was not to be subject to
negotiation of any sort, and it had to be defended
by military action - including US intervention if need be. (This has remained the hard core of
continued on page 4 •

THE PROSPECTS FDR
MASS DRO\NNING
The Red River Delta is North Vietnam's heartlar,d.
Here most of its people live - some 12.5 million.
Here is where most of its farmland is located and
most of its food produced. Here too is where the
danger of floods during the rainy season is greatest,
and where the dike system has been painfully constructed
over a thousand years. The region's dependence on
its flood control system - the drainage ditches ·,
pumping stations, dams, but most especially the dikes•
is absolute. Without these great earthwork fort•
ifications nearly two thirds of the plain's farm•
land would be inundated every summer. Without the
dikes all cultivation in the wet and the' dry season
would be frustrated:
The Red River must be surrounded· by embankments
in order for the delta to be fit for cultivation.
Indeed ••• (without them it) would block all attetnl)ts
at agriculture. Every year, on the average,
the fifth month rice,(harvested in June) would be·
lost. Two years out of three, the transplanted
seedlings for the tenth month rice (harvested in
November) would be destroyed ••• so late in the
growing season that they would not be replaced in
time to get an acceptable crop. Rice culture is
only possible if the Red River is contained by dikes.
It is impossible to obtain a harvest from October
to May. The most important crop, that of the tenth
month, is reaped in November: the rice thrives on
the heavy summer rainfall; it ripens during the dry
dry and sunny weather from October to December.
The fifth month crop feeds on the high humidity .
and periods of rain (during the dry season)
and ripens during th~ heat of early Summer. There is
no way to schedule a ~cops~ thac it could be
entirely protected from the seasonal floods. A
crop replanted in late October would suffer from
dry and cracked soil because November and December
are the driest months of the year .. Should it
survive it would stagnate during the cold and
sunless periods of mists and fine rains. Then,
its stay in the soil uselessly lengthened _to six
months, it would ripen in early May. The present
agricultural rhythm is demanded by the climate.
One could not imagine it any other wav.
The source of the Delta's great vulnerability
lies in a combination of the givens of geography
and climate. As in the lowlands to the South, the
region's rainfall is not evenly distributed
throughout the year. At Hanoi something like two
thirds of it falls during the wet season months
of June through September and only about one
seventh during the December to April dry season.
The further South one goes in North Vietnam the
later and shorter is the rainy season. Most of the
precipitation during the wet season is accounted
for by thunderstorms and by the one or two typhoons
which graze the coast every year. As for the typhoons,
the quantity of rain they can bring in their wake
is enormous. Oddly enough the delta is not part
of the Red River's watershed. The river's drainage
basin lies to the North and Northwest, in the
mountains of North Vietnam and in the plateau of
Southern Yunnan. Slopes and drainage channels here
are usually steep and great tracts of land are
treeless. As a result a very large proportion of
the region's rainfall -~omething like 50 percent•
eventually finds its way to the sea.
The river that is fed by this watershed is
extraordinary. During the Winter it is a mere
stream scarcely 2.5 meters deep at Hanoi, with a
flow rate of 700 cubic meters per second. Barely

five months later it is a raging torrent which
upon occasion has stood more than twelve meters
high at Hanoi and discharged more than 23,000
cubic meters a second. Upstream, where the Red
River enters the delta at Viet Tri, the flow
rate can reach 30,000 cubic meters a second. The
flood season begins in June and extends through
October. About half the time the river crests above
7 meters at Hanoi at least once before June 30;
in two years out of three it crests above this
level at least three times after September 1. In
most years the high water mark will exceed 9.5
meters at Hanoi at least once. Still higher crests
are fairly common.
Such is the might of this great river whose
peak discharge rate during the rainy season is
twice that of the Nile and the Indus put together
and equal to the maximum discharge rate of the
Danube. The flooding of nearly two fifths of the
delta's farmland lowered its water level less than
ten per cent.
The plain over which these enormvus masses of
water roll every summer is flat, low and among the
most densely populated rural areas in the world
with an average density of 621 people per square
kilometre (1580 people per square mile). In the
Northwest, including all of the delta above the
Red River and west of a line drawn parallel to the
western side of Hai Duong province, the main rivers
ride on a kind of "alluvial cushion.. which spills
out over their banks for some way. These natural
dikes are broken in many places and they stand two
or three metres high above the surrounding plain.
Because of their modest elevation, the ridges
have long been favored as village sites. When they
intemect they form enormous basins within which
water tends to collect. It is upon this networ~
ot alluvium that the dike system in the Northwest
is superimposed. Dikes are less frequent h~re
than in other parts of the delta. In the main
thev are confined to the banks of the major rivers.
B~t they are higher and more massive than to the
e.a st, where the river's maximum stages become
progressively lower •. Though less densely peopled
than other parts of the delta, densities are still
very high.
The land abruptly changes character as one moves
eastward along the northern bank of the Red River
In contrast to the northwest, where the rivers
meander across the plain on top of alluvial ridges,
stream beds are now usually lower than the surrounding
plain. The main exception to this are the four fingers
of land between the alluvial ridges of the "'Canal
des Rapides", the Cau River, the Thuong River, the
Luc Nam River and the hills of ·the "Sept ,agodes".
This is an area menaced by serious flooding. If
the three rivers rise simultaneously the lowlying
basins are invaded and can only drain themselves
slowly.
to the south of the Red River and extending all

the way from Viet Tri to the sea is the lower delta.
It is the mostly densely populated part of the plain
and probably the part which is most vulnerable to
serious flooding should the dikes be destroyed. The
land is low, but no lower on the average than in
the eastern delta north of the Red River. But the
area is criss-crossed by alluvial ridges and drainage is poor. As a result, when there is flooding
here, the water pools because it has no place to
go. The most important of the region's basins lies
in the province of Ha Dong. Some 880,000 people
live within its bounds, cultivating 107,000 hectares.
The ridges of the Red River, the Phu Ly Canal, and

embankments of the Day are the highest in the delta.
They stand six meters above sea level while the
surrounding basin is only two meters above sea level.
Natural drainage is also quite poor in Son Tay
province, which lies between the right bank of the
Day and the mountains which mark the western border
of the delta, and in Ha Nam province to the east of
Ha Dong. All told, perhaps two thirds of the cultivated
land to the south of the Red River is contained
in lowlvin~ basins in which water naturally tends to
collect. In 1960 some 1,740,000 people lived in
these provinces. The figure is probably well over
2 million today.
The capital city of Hanoi and the provinces of
Hung Yen and Bae Ninh on the north bank of the
Red River occupy intermediary positions. Both Hung
Yen and Bae Ninh are quite low. Elevations range from
from 1 to 4 meters above sea level and 2 to 4 ~eters
above sea level respectively. The southern part of
Hung Yen is especially vulnerable to destruction of
its dikes. Here the land is only 1 to 2 meters
above sea level and the Red River can rise above
7 meters in the rainy season. Still, natural
drainage in this area is much better than in the great
basins to the south. Some 1,171,400 people lived
in the two provinces in 1960. The number is closer
to one and a half million today.
Hanoi itself stands on an alluvial ridge 6 meters
above sea level. But parts of it are only 4 meters
above sea level. As noted above the Red River
often crests here during the rainy season at 10
or 11 meters. Were the dikes to give way at their
base during one of these periods, a wall of water 15
15 feet high could roar through the streets of
Hanoi. Its population in 1960 was 643,000. According
to recent reports, 80 per cent of its people have
been evacuated. One or two hundred thou~and have
remained behind.
Perhaps the best clue of all about the effects
of an all-out attack on the dikes and dams comes
from the Pentagon Papers. Buried in a discussion
of North Vietnam's probable import capacity after
the mining of its ports is an estimate of the amount
of rice which it would have to import were its
dikes and irrigation dams specifically targeted for
destruction. Using this figure - 220,000 t·o 920,000
metric tons of rice- we can derive 160,000 to 685,000
hectares as the ammount of riceland which the warplanners envisioned flooding. Now, bearing in mind
that the farmers who till this land live nearby
- sometimes in villages built on low alluvial ridges,
sometimes in -villages at the same level as their
fields - we can make a rough estimate of the number
of people who stand in danger of drowning if the dikes
were destroyed without warning. For all we need to do
is multiply the average population density of the
delta• 621 per square kilometre - by the area of
t~e land affected by flooding. To be sure When we
o this, the high end of our estimate mu;t include
areas in which the river level is not great enough
to threaten human life (for the high estimate
involved about half the arable land of the delta).
Still, it is a sobering exercise. For when we do
it we see that the war planners had in mind flooding
an area containing from l million to 4.25 million
people. This is over and beyond the hundreds and
thousands of people who would be affected if the Red
River dikes protecting Hanoi were destroyed.
But, of course, as the President said on April 30,
1972, the system of the dikes and dams is 11a strategic
target and indirectly a military target".

Drawing by Laotian refugee.
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In 1972 Glad Day Press, a movement shop in Ithaca,
New York, produced the Viet Nam 1972 calendar. The
calendar had three aims: to present some aspects
of Vietnamese culture and history, to outline the
U.S. war of aggression in Viet Nam and to relay
information about the Vietnamese people's war of
resistance-.
Nixon's massive escalation of the war since April
'72, coupled with his mystification of the American
public through deceptive troop withdrawals, made
an update of the Viet Nam calendar imperative. It
was determined at the same time to include material
on Laos and Cambodia, countries whose culture and
whose ongoing resistance struggles have achieved
significant victories. This led naturally to a
proposed 1973 calendar on Indochina, which would
serve as a year round reminder of the ongoing
struggles there.
While Glad Day worked on the Viet Nam calendar,
other peace movement activists organized Medical
Aid for Indochina. In only one year of existence,
MAI has already provided liberated Indochina with
medical supplies requested by health officials there,
including some of the most modern equipment available.
This success reflects MA.I's public information
campaign and its organization of supply channels,
despite the high intensity of hostile activity in
the war zone.
With Indo-China '73, the two groups are working
jointly to realize their common aims. Proceeds from
calendar sales will be split between MAI and Glad
Day, which will use the funds to buy equipment to
improve its anti-war printing capabilities.
The total cost of the calendar and mailing is $3.75.
Orders should be sent to;
Glad Day Press
308 Stewart Ave.
Ithaca
New York 14850.
(607) 273-0535.
The calendar is 28 pages, wall size (17 by 22),
lithographed in color on heavy cream stock, has
over 250 photographs and line drawings, poems, songs,
stories, legends, history, protest art by students
and soldiers and an Indo-China fact sheet.

US policy in Vietnam ever since.)" What has wavered is not America's strategic goal, but our
leaders' confidence that the goal could be reached.
This is evident in Kennedy's and Johnson's hesitant, stop-and-go escalations. It is evident in
McGovern's condemnation of the war in 1963, His
vote for the Tonkin Gulf resolution in August,
1964, his public support for Johnson's policy of
strafing North Vietnam in early 1965, and his allout opposition to the war now. And it was evident
when Johnson stopped bombing northern Vietnam,
began the Paris talks, and retired from public
life after building US troop strength up to an
unprecedented 560,000.
When Johnson was forced to halt the war's escalation temporarily in 1968, he was on the defensive
on several fronts. His popularity with the electorate was at the lowest level of his Administration,
while the anti-war movement was growing daily. He
had just weathered the NI.F's politically and tactically costly Tet offensive. War-spawned inflation and balance of payments problems were plagueing the economy. And the huge commitment of military resources to Vietnam was undermining this
country's prestige and taxing its ability to act
freely in the rest of the world.
President McGovern's compelling influences would
be somewhat different. First, the current PRG
offensive has been militarily and politically
disastrous for the Thieu regime. The offensive's
goal was not to capture large cities, where both
the liberation forces and the people could be destroyed systematically by massive terror bombing.
Instead, the goal was to draw the ARVN i .n to several
defensive enclaves, where they could be harassed
and decimated - while local NLF forces in the provinces, in the absence of Government soldiers, destroyed pacification programs which had taken years
to build. And the strategy is working - in Quangtri,
Kontum, Anloc, Binh Dinh, Quangnai, the populous
Mekong Delta - the PRG-NLF is stronger than ever.
Thieu's army is increasingly being confined to the
cities, and the Americans have already been confined to the air, leaving most of the countryside
to the liberation forces. In January, McGovern
would face an untenable military situation, the
absolute hatred of the Saigon regime, which has
called him "an insane, lying dog, a raving, filthy
pig," and he would face American people, with
their newly encouraged hopes for peace. McGovern's
candidacy has been largely predicated on his
strong opposition to the war. He would have little
option other than to carry out his pledge: peace,
on the terms of the PRG-NLF.
McGovern would not end the war because the American people trust him to, or hope he will, but because his political survival depends on it. The
impatience and disillusionment of the American
people, and the current liberation offensive in
Vietnam have put the American government up against
the wall. The election offers an auspicious opportunity for the final success of .the movement
against the Vietnam war, and it also has in it
the seeds of a tragic, long-term defeat. Nixon's
July 17 press conference reminds us of the seriousness of our effort. He said, "We do not contemplate using tactical . nuclear weapons at this
~ . " After invasions . of Cambodia and Laos, bombing dik~s, mining harbors, and massive use of air
power have failed to bring Vietnam to its knees,
Nixon has only one further terrible weapon in his
arsenal. And make no mistake. HP. is the kind of
President who could very well use it.

We should understand clearly who McGovern is, his
limitations, his capacity for opportunism and betrayal of principles, his need to accomodate and
cultivate people like Richard Daley and George Wallace. And we should understand that George McGovern
is a qualitative improvement over Richard Nixon.
We must beware McGovern's weaknesses, and support
McGovern.

''Boston Legal Aid, A Reference Booklet", a guide
to legal aid services in Boston is now available.
Edited by Kent Jarrell, a Boston University
senior, the booklet offers information on 25
Boston .agencies that give assistance in the areas
of criminal, civil, discrimination, prisoner,
consumer protection, housing and military legal
problems.
Information supplied about each group includes
addresses, contacts, phone numbers, staffing, types
of cases accepted, eligibility requirements,
funding, history and breakdown of cases.
Copies may be ordered from Sensory Press, 45
Waverly Avenue, Newton at $2.50 each plus .08
Mass. sales tax and .23 for postage.

SEPTEMBER GRANTS
Indiana Peace and Freedom Party, Muncie.Indiana;
A small grant to encourage them in their work of
organizing high school students, women and publishing a newsletter.
Ujamaa, St. Petersburg, Florida; Help with problems they have had over the Summer. Ujamaa is
an independent black restaurant whose funtion is
to raise money for the Black Movement.
West Chicago Workers' Centre; For rent and office
equipment to establish a meeting place, produce
leaflets and newspaper and provide a centre where
workers can gather to discuss their situation. ·
Jackson Human Rights Project, Jackson, Miss.;
Aid in purchasing a house for their school.
The school was started in '68 to provide
meaningful education for black children.
Charleston Community Project, Charleston, s.c.;
Seed money toward their general running costs
The project consists of 4 men and 1 woman who
live together and work with servicemen, women
and veterans.

VVAW 1 Tuscaloosa, Alabama; Assistance in
paying off the debt on their newsletter. They
have been actively organizing in the Alabama
region with considerable success.
Selma Project, Tuscaloosa, Alabama;
Help
with purchasing a movie projector to be used by
them and other people in Alabama.
Hope Centre, Tucson, Arizona; For costs in
running a methadone centre which works mainly
with Chicanos but also with Indians in the area.
Prison Law Collective, San FranciSCQ.i. Toward an
ongoing program work~ng with prisoners in Folsom
and San Quentin and helping build consciousness
of prisons and their function in society.

